Why Google Is Blocking Antigravity OAuth in Third-Party Tools Like OpenClaw

A wave of user reports has converged on the same failure mode: after authenticating third-party “agent” tooling with Google Antigravity / Gemini CLI OAuth flows, users are abruptly blocked with 403 errors and “Terms of Service” disablements—often without a warning or a clearly navigable, timely support path.

The strongest “on the record” evidence comes from threads on the Google AI Developers Forum, where affected paid subscribers describe being locked out after connecting “Gemini models via OpenClaw OAuth,” and where one posted support reply (quoted in full in-thread) states that internal investigation confirmed a Terms of Service violation because credentials were used “within the third-party tool ‘open claw’… due to the use of Antigravity servers to power a non-Antigravity product,” with an asserted “zero tolerance” position and (in that account) no reversal.

The same symptom set appears across community channels like Reddit and Hacker News: users reporting 403 PERMISSION_DENIED, “Gemini has been disabled… for violation of Terms of Service,” and attributing the trigger to using Antigravity/Gemini OAuth with OpenClaw-style agents or CLI harnesses.

A crucial clarification: multiple users explicitly report that their broader Google account is not fully disabled, and that they can still access other Google services and “Gemini on the web,” while Antigravity and Gemini Code Assist / Gemini CLI features appear blocked for that account. That points to a service-level suspension (Antigravity / Cloud Code Assist / Gemini CLI backends) rather than a universal account lock—though some users fear broader spillover because many Google services are identity-linked.

What OpenClaw and AntiGravity Auth actually are

“AntiGravity” here is not a generic term: Google Antigravity is positioned by Google as an “agentic development platform” that goes beyond autocomplete to orchestrate autonomous agents across editor, terminal, and browser surfaces. Google’s own developer materials emphasize a “Mission Control” style interface and “agent-first” workflows.

In parallel, Google’s Gemini CLI is described in official developer documentation as an open source AI agent that runs in the terminal using a “reason and act (ReAct) loop,” with quotas tied to Gemini Code Assist editions and an option to use a Gemini API key for pay-as-you-go.

OpenClaw (the third-party tool at the center of these reports) markets itself as a local-first “open agent platform” that runs on your machine and connects through chat surfaces (Telegram/WhatsApp/Discord/Slack, etc.), rather than being a pure SaaS assistant.

Where this becomes risky is how OpenClaw integrates with Google’s agent stack. OpenClaw’s own documentation distinguishes several “Google” lanes:

• A Gemini API key path (a conventional developer integration) that expects an API key.
• A separate “Antigravity OAuth” path shipped as a bundled plugin (disabled by default in docs), and described elsewhere in OpenClaw docs/tests as an “Antigravity OAuth bridge” that behaves like a “Cloud Code Assist-style agent endpoint.”

This distinction matters because it explains why many users experienced the bans as puzzling: from the user’s perspective, they “logged in with Google” inside a tool; from Google’s internal perspective (and per the quoted support reply), the result can look like using Antigravity’s backend to power a non-Antigravity client.

You can see how “non-official client” behavior arises in the OpenClaw code ecosystem itself: OpenClaw pull requests and issues discuss updating “client identity” metadata and headers to satisfy Antigravity server-side checks, implying that Antigravity endpoints enforce expectations about what the calling client should look like.

What the evidence says about the ban wave

The ban pattern is not supported solely by anecdotes; it appears across multiple independent channels with consistent error messaging.

On the Google AI Developers Forum, affected users describe:

• Immediate or sudden disablement after integrating a third-party client with Antigravity OAuth, with the recurring 403 copy: “This service has been disabled in this account for violation of Terms of Service.”
• The “unexpected issue setting up your account” Antigravity login failure concurrent with Gemini Code Assist errors.
• Confusion over escalation paths, with some users reporting being bounced between support channels (Google Cloud vs. subscription support), and long waits for responses via the published feedback email.
• Most importantly, one forum participant posted a reply they attribute to Google support after “full investigation,” stating the suspension affects “Gemini CLI and any other service that uses the Cloud Code Private API,” and that the use of credentials in “open claw” violated Google Terms of Service because it used “Antigravity servers to power a non-Antigravity product,” with “zero tolerance” and no reversal.

On Reddit, a widely shared thread frames the situation as “aggressive banning” of users using Antigravity/Gemini OAuth with third-party tools, again anchored on the same 403 “disabled for ToS violation” outcome, including paid AI Pro subscribers.

Within the OpenClaw project itself, an issue filed February 11, 2026 summarizes the same dual symptom set—Gemini CLI login failures with the ToS disablement message and Antigravity setup failures—explicitly linking to the forum thread and Reddit posts as “community reports,” and urging removal of those auth methods to protect users.

A separate meta-signal: OpenClaw’s own changelog (2026.2.23) shows the project ultimately removed Google Antigravity provider support and the bundled google-antigravity-auth plugin, explicitly instructing migration to other providers. This is a strong indicator that maintainers concluded the risk/fragility of Antigravity OAuth integration outweighed its value.

Why OAuth token rerouting trips Terms of Service and security enforcement

It’s tempting to treat this as “Google is banning automation,” but the policy collision is narrower and sharper: it’s about who a token is meant for, what backend it unlocks, and how the resulting traffic is interpreted.

OAuth itself is an authorization framework that lets a third-party application obtain limited access on a user’s behalf via tokens. Those tokens are powerful enough—and in many ecosystems, portable enough—that if a tool can obtain them and relay them elsewhere, it can effectively “borrow” the identity and privileges associated with the original authorized client.

From Google’s policy perspective, the key points are:

• Google’s Terms of Service require users not to “abuse” services or protective measures, and explicitly prohibit behaviors like “bypassing… protective measures,” “reverse engineering… except as allowed,” and “providing services that appear to originate from us when they do not.”
• Google’s API Services User Data Policy requires developers to accurately represent identity and intent, prohibits deceptive or unauthorized use, and notes Google may revoke/suspend access to Google API Services (and sometimes other products) for noncompliance or if an app enables violations.
• Google’s OAuth policies add constraints around secure origins/redirects and user-agent handling, reflecting a broader expectation that OAuth flows—and the apps behind them—conform to specific security and transparency rules.

Now connect that to what users and maintainers report was happening technically:

• OpenClaw documentation characterizes the “google-antigravity” integration as an OAuth “bridge” to a Cloud Code Assist-style endpoint rather than the public Gemini API key endpoint.
• A forum support reply (as posted) says the violation is that Antigravity servers were used “to power a non-Antigravity product.”

That combination—non-official client + official backend—is exactly the shape that triggers platform enforcement across many ecosystems: the provider subsidizes or rate-limits a service assuming first-party client behaviors, telemetry, and abuse controls, then sees traffic that (a) doesn’t match the expected harness and (b) may amplify cost/abuse risk.

Some community members go further and hypothesize concrete detection signals (WAF/risk engines, client fingerprinting, proxy patterns, token usage anomalies). Those details are not independently verified, but they are consistent with the existence of “server-side client/version checks” discussed in OpenClaw pull requests and user reports of automated sweeps. Treat these as plausible interpretations, not confirmed mechanisms.

Practical risk management for AI enthusiasts and developers

The most important operational takeaway is that “Google sign-in works” does not mean “this use is permitted.” A third-party tool can complete an OAuth flow and still put your account in violation depending on what it does with the resulting tokens and what backend it calls.

The safest pattern, repeatedly reinforced by both Google’s own developer ecosystem and the post-incident maintainers’ decisions, is:

• Use official, intended access channels. If you are building tooling around Gemini models, the Gemini API + API key route is explicitly documented and bounded by published terms (and is structurally different from piggybacking on an IDE subscription backend).
• Avoid OAuth “bridges” that route subscription entitlements through unofficial clients. OpenClaw’s later changelog explicitly removes Antigravity provider support and tells users to migrate away, underscoring that this path became untenable.
• Assume your local agent environment is a high-value credential target. Agent frameworks often store API keys and tokens locally. Security reporting has already highlighted infostealer malware extracting OpenClaw configuration data, with the risk that stolen secrets could unlock connected apps/accounts.

Relatedly, access tokens are designed to be short-lived, while refresh tokens extend access—so an attacker who steals the right artifacts can potentially maintain access beyond a single session.

If you experiment anyway, separate blast radius. Community members frequently advise using non-primary accounts for risky experimentation. That advice is not a cure, but it is rational risk containment when identity-linked services (email, storage, subscriptions) matter.

Recovery reality and what affected users report doing

Recovery is inconsistent, and some reports indicate irreversible outcomes—so any “fix list” must be framed as best-effort, not guaranteed restoration.

What “recovery” looks like in practice is evident in the forum threads:

• Users are repeatedly told (by community members and moderators) to contact the dedicated email shown in the error message (commonly gemini-code-assist-user-feedback@google.com) and to file in-product feedback when possible.
• Some users explicitly report revoking connected app access, removing the third-party tool/proxy, and then attempting appeals—again with uncertain response times.
• Others describe escalating through subscription support channels (e.g., Google One) because the disablement is tied to personal subscriptions rather than a typical Google Cloud billing account—though even those escalation loops are described as confusing and slow.
• The harshest constraint appears in the posted “investigation” reply that claims zero-tolerance and “unable to reverse the suspension” once the system concludes Antigravity servers were used to power a non-Antigravity product. If accurate and representative, this means prevention is far more effective than remediation.

Finally, even if the suspension is service-scoped (Antigravity/Gemini Code Assist), users should consider data resilience. Google’s own Terms note that in certain situations Google may provide an opportunity to export content via Google Takeout when services change or stop (subject to law/policy)—a reminder that account-level dependencies deserve backups.

Broader implications for AI agents and “subscription token arbitrage”

The OpenClaw/Antigravity situation is part of a broader pattern: model providers sell subscriptions priced for “human-in-the-loop” interactive usage, while open source agents and third-party harnesses can generate traffic patterns (and costs) closer to API workloads. The incentives push users toward “subscription token arbitrage”—routing high-volume agent usage through subscription entitlements rather than metered APIs—until providers clamp down.

Anthropic’s recent clarification—explicitly forbidding the use of OAuth subscription tokens in third-party harnesses and explaining the support/telemetry problems created by unusual traffic—shows that Google is not alone in viewing this as an existential product-economics and abuse-control issue.

In that light, Google’s Antigravity enforcement wave can be read less as an anti-open-source stance and more as an attempt to preserve a boundary: Antigravity’s OAuth-backed agent backend is intended to be consumed by Antigravity (and closely related first-party clients), while open ecosystem integrations are expected to use published APIs and keys. That boundary is stated bluntly in the forum-quoted support reply (“use of Antigravity servers to power a non-Antigravity product”).

What this leaves the ecosystem with is a gap: users want interoperability between the best harness (agent UX) and the best models, while providers want cost control, telemetry, and a defensible business model. Until providers offer sanctioned “bring your own harness” subscription tiers—or until third-party tools standardize on metered APIs—the ban-wave dynamic is likely to recur across vendors.